Back to the Future? : The re-alignment between the US and EU on one side…

Posted on 2 June 2014 by redaksiyon

Russia, Euro-Asia and China on the other

Avrasya Ekonomik Birliği’nin Türkiye’ye katkısı ne olur?

Rusya’dan BMGK’ya Ukrayna tasarısı

Moldova ile Vize Muafiyeti Anlaşması Yürürlüğe Girdi.

Belarus ile Vize Muafiyeti Anlaşması Yürürlüğe Girdi.

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NATO Defence Ministers’ Meeting.

Collective defence and preparations for the NATO Wales Summit in September will be in the spotlight at a two-day meeting of defence ministers which begins on Tuesday (3 June). Ministers will also meet with their Ukrainian and Georgian counterparts and discuss the ISAF mission in Afghanistan with ISAF contributors and the Afghan defence minister.

The first working session will focus on the broader and longer-term implications of Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine in terms of collective defence. Ministers will discuss what more needs to be done in the medium and long term. This will include discussions on raising the responsiveness of the NATO Response Force, and more focus on special forces, cyber defence and stepped-up exercises.

Ministers will then hold a session of the NATO-Ukraine Commission to discuss the security situation in Ukraine and priorities for defence cooperation between NATO and Ukraine. This will be followed by a second working session of the 28 Allies to discuss the broader preparations for the Wales Summit in terms of readiness, military capabilities and defence investment.

Wednesday will begin with a session of the NATO-Georgia Commission to discuss the current status of Georgia’s defence reforms, and plans for further work. It will also be a chance to discuss the wider regional implications of the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

The ministerial will conclude with a meeting of ISAF contributors and the Afghan defence minister. They will assess the current security situation, the status of planning for NATO’s proposed non-combat mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan forces from the beginning of next year, and progress in the transition of security responsibility to the Afghan security forces. Ministers will also review the political transition following the 5 April elections, including with a view to the second round in June. Source.

NATO’s New Horizons

After the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Western leaders intensely debated the future direction of the transatlantic alliance. The Clinton administration favored expanding NATO to both extend its security umbrella to the east and consolidate democratic gains in the former Warsaw Pact. Others wished to peel back the Pentagon’s commitments in Europe with the fading of the Soviet threat.

Across the Atlantic, NATO allies were also split on the issue. London feared enlargement would dilute the alliance, while Paris believed it would give NATO too much influence. Many in France hoped to integrate former Soviet states via European institutions. There was also concern about alienating Russia.

For the White House, the decision held larger meaning. “[President Clinton] considered NATO enlargement a litmus test of whether the U.S. would remain internationally engaged and defeat the isolationist and unilateralist sentiments that were emerging,” wrote Ronald D. Asmus, one of the intellectual architects of NATO expansion, in Opening NATO’s Door (2002).

In his first trip to Europe as president (January 1994), Clinton announced that NATO enlargement was “no longer a question of whether but when and how.” Just days before, alliance leaders approved the launch of the Partnership for Peace, a program designed to strengthen ties with Central and Eastern European countries, including many former Soviet republics like Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia. Read the File : A Revived Alliance?

Lessons from the post-cold war transformation of East Central Europe’s arms industry

by Yudit Kiss – Arms production was the backbone of the Soviet-type command economy systems in East Central Europe (ECE). With the collapse of the Eastern bloc, arms makers faced a drastic disruption in their economic, political and social environment. During the bumpy adjustment and integration into West European institutions and world markets that unfolded, many ECE arms producers went bankrupt and the bulk of the companies that have survived continue to struggle. Their experiences, documented in a new SIPRI monograph, provide valuable lessons for arms industries in other parts of the world, including Ukraine.

Lessons for the future

An analysis of ECE weapon-producing industries also highlights major shifts in the world’s arms industrial production and structures. It shows how country-based, large-scale industrial giants have turned into global networks for R&D, production and system integration. It also reveals the accelerated pace of changes, the permanent, mutual catching-up dynamic between civilian and military-related production, and the increasing role that emerging countries play in the field. Finally, it highlights the entry and growing importance of purely financial actors that seriously modify the sector and might represent important security hazards.

Similar to the situation of the early 1990s, the current crisis of the global economy might represent an opportunity for weapon-producing firms to accomplish radical structural changes. Future development prospects for most of these companies are limited; they could switch to such new fields as energy or environmental protection. Full report.

Lessons and Consequences of World War I: Back to the Future? (I)

By Andrew KORYBKO – After the Cold War, NATO continued to grow unabated, gobbling up the remnants of the Warsaw Pact and part of the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. Although mutual military defense is not legally binding in NATO (Article 5 does not explicitly stipulate military assistance, leaving it up to each member state to make that decision on its own), the perception is that it is. This means that the US and its cohorts may get dangerously drawn into a regional conflict in order to save face. Turkey’s provocative actions in Syria or its failed plans for a false-flag attack there should send alarm bells ringing for the rest of the world. The same can be said for Poland and Lithuania, also NATO members, in regards to their plans to create a joint brigade with non-member Ukraine. Clearly, one middle power in a major alliance can draw the rest of its twenty-seven members into a disastrous calamity. Leaving NATO aside, the US has a mutual defense agreement with Japan, whom it has been egging on to provoke China. The security guarantees provided by America to Israel and Saudi Arabia could also easily suck it into a regional war with Iran.

Lesson:

Military alliances are a type of nearly sacrosanct agreement that states enter into with one another, placing their prestige and the lives of their citizens on the line for their partners. They should not be entered into as a form of political statement. The larger the alliance is, the greater the chance for unintended outbreaks of major war and for middle players to manipulate the other members. It is totally unstable when Obama, in referring to the US, proudly tells the graduating class of West Point that, “From Europe to Asia, we are the hub of alliances unrivaled in the history of nations.” Exceptionally dangerous are so-called “defensive” alliances that only have a track record of offensive military action (e.g. every NATO war). Alliances can complicate the political situation just as much as they can clarify it. Read Part I

The Lessons and Consequences of World War I: Back to the Future? (II)

By Andrew KORYBKO – The Damascus Protocol of 1914 set the basis for the 1915-1916 McMahon-Hussein Correspondence, in which the borders of the future Arab Kingdom of Syria were to be specified. This was to include all of modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Israel, most of Western Jordan and Iraq, and parts of southern Turkey. Duplicitously, the British were at the same time busy conspiring with the French to divide the Mideast into colonial zones through the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Later, they concluded the Balfour Agreement in 1917 (which overlapped with the territory promised to the Arab Kingdom of Syria), clearly indicating that they never had any intention of honoring their promises of securing an independent Arab statecenteredaround Syria. The destruction and occupation of the Arab Kingdom of Syria by France in 1920 doomed the dream of Syrian independence until after 1946. Even so, the French had by then forcibly dislocated Lebanon from Syria and even gave up Hatay Province to Turkey in 1939, despite both areas historically being part of Syrian civilization for centuries.
The betrayal of Syria after World War I is a textbook case of political pimping, and its legacy is the mangled Middle East of today.

Why It Matters Now:

Second and third-tier states are more endangered now than ever before. Brzezinski’s destructive Eurasian Balkans strategy specifically targets the states in the Rimland, the majority of which fit this category (excluding India and China). Color Revolutions, for example, aspire to create a geopolitical earthquake to shatter the Eurasian Rimland and bring about the collapse of the Heartland. Other times, however, more traditional methods of warfare are employed hand-in-hand with diplomatic deception. The most stunning case is Iraq’s military engagement Kuwait in 1990. Read Part II

Europe’s New Arc of Instability in the 21st Century

By Michael Werbowski – The old post-cold war order is now forever over. A quarter century after the falloff the Berlin Wall, a new and highly volatile geopolitical landscape is emerging in Europe. Its contours and content are not yet clearly evident, however.

But in this tumultuous year of 2014 (marking a hundred years since the start of the “Great War”, and two hundred years after the Congress of Vienna) global events as in the past, are again(and with a vengeance) re-shaping or determining the way the map of Europe might look likein the coming decades.The extremely violent ructions in Ukraine showcase such a trend.

This “semi-autonomous”and relatively stable former Soviet republic was once known as the “bread basket” of the USSR. It’s today just an impoverished basket case, left for the IMF to pillage and plunder in the name of “freedom and democracy”. Since declaring its independence in 1991, “The Ukraine” has gone from being a notoriously kleptocractic and corrupt state, to a fragmented and failed state. The incipient civil war there,which the world is now witnessing, disturbingly resembles the post-colonial conflicts(or prolonged proxy wars) of the 1980s fought in Angola and Mozambique.

Whereby its western half is being wrenched away from its eastern half by foreign and a corporatist interest, its eastern half is immersed in a secessionist struggle. The western backed pro-EU and US coup, has resulted in a head on collision with Russia’s traditional or historical (post imperial and post-Soviet) geo-strategic imperatives. Ukraine’s eastern part or its Russo phone“borderlands”(Dnieper Lowlands) are being Balkanized as a result of the US-EU orchestrated “Maidan revolution”,and in the aftermath of Crimea’s re-unification ( or some say “annexation”) with “mother Russia”. This is the first time since the break-up of the former Yugoslavia (followed by a NATO led air war against Moscow’s stanch alley Serbia) in the 1990s, that a territorial implosion of such magnitude is taking place in Europe.

Back to the Future for Europe: spheres of influence and cordon sanitaire are back in style

The outcome of this Ukrainian territorial tussle is unknown. However, further destabilisation is likely whatever happens. Meanwhile, a buffer zone or cordon sanitaire is being delineated or established between the EU and the US on one side, and a remerging (some say belligerent) Russia on the other. This swathe of land runs from Kaliningrad (the non-contagious Russian enclave) in the Baltics region, along the Crimean peninsula(now once more Russian territory) on the Black sea, and ends down inthe Russian Caucuses or around Georgia. Ukraine is the biggest land mass in the middle of this fractious corridor. It is thus seeing its territory being dismembered, as part of a re-alignment or “great game” being played out by foreign powers vying for influence in the region.

Amid this shifting of geo-political tectonic plates, the inchoate central government in Kiev is in turmoil.It has neither the military wherewithal in terms of manpower, equipment and intelligence; nor the legitimate authority (despite the recent presidential vote) it needs to control the centrifugal forceswhich are tearing the country apart.

Without doubt, there is an“arc of instability” running across the continent. This developing danger zone is potentially a grave threat to peace and stability for all of Europe.Moreover, much smaller states such as Moldavia and Georgia belong nowhere right now; that is neither to Russia’s sphere of influence nor the west’s. In view of Ukraine’s plight they are seeking a safe haven for themselves, apparently in western structures such as NATO and the EU. Hence, this week the EU has called on along with Ukraine, for the two aforementioned states to also join its club. The EU’s clear intent is toincrease its overextended membership or shift more to the east, no matter what the costs might be to the trade bloc’s already austerity constrained budget. As for bi-lateral EU- Russia ties, they will likely be negatively impacted by such pronouncements. Washington for its part seems to have put its plans to expand NATO ever closer to Russia’s borders temporarily on hold. A wise move indeed. Full analysis.

Can Petro Poroshenko Save Ukraine?

By Matthew Rojansky – Poroshenko’s victory is unlikely to bring change mainly because Ukraine has already changed on its own, denying the traditional political class—including Poroshenko and each of his main rivals—a stable footing on which to ply their trade. In fact, the factions that divide Ukraine today don’t give a hoot for the promises of political candidates, or the outcome of the elections.

The situation of the so-called “people’s republics” led by pro-Russian separatists in parts of the southeastern Donbass is already well known, as is that of Russian-occupied Crimea. Yet there is another, nominally pro-Ukrainian part of the population, which harbors almost equal contempt for the acting authorities in Kyiv. Some are now serving in loosely constituted “national guard” and other paramilitary units that have gone to Donbass to fight the separatists.

The deepest division may not even be between those fighting on opposite sides in Donbass, but rather within Kyiv itself, between those who see themselves as guardians of an ongoing revolution, and those who are basically prepared to go back to business as usual.

This split is evident on the Maidan, where dirt-streaked activists continue to occupy their makeshift barricades and encampments round the clock, while self-appointed defense forces carry weapons, inspect passing traffic, and conduct drills. Amid the semi-ordered chaos, among the makeshift memorials to fallen protestors and along the tent-lined streets, well-heeled locals and visitors go about their business as if nothing has changed, buying ice cream, snapping photos, and popping in and out of fashionable shops. For the moment, the two sides seem almost to ignore one another.

This surreal coexistence of (…) Full article.

Ukraine’s Kiev Regime is not “Officially” A Neo-Nazi Government

By Prof Michel Chossudovsky – Do they know who they are?

Do we know who they are?

There are “ultra-conservatives” in the Kiev government but “they are not Neo-Nazis.” According to the Western media, its all part of “a relentless Kremlin-driven propaganda offensive that uses World War II-era terms and imagery”.

The alternative media, however, has acknowledged that the Kiev regime is “a loose Centre-Right coalition” integrated by two Neo-Nazi parties (Svoboda and Right Sector) “but it is not a Neo-Nazi government”. Both Svoboda and Right Sector display Nazi emblems.

Is it a loose coalition? If a government were to officially display Nazi emblems, does that not suggest that the government is committed to Nazi ideology?

When the Kiev regime “officially” displays Nazi emblems to identify entities of their National Security and Military apparatus one would normally assume that it is a Neo-Nazi government.

Below is the Nazi emblem of the National Guard [Національна гвардія України] which is defined as Reserves of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. They operate under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The National Guard is part of the so-called “Internal Troops of Ukraine.” The emblem is a stylized swastika Full analysis.

The Big Picture of the Geopolitical Chess Game: Ukraine is A “Square on the Chessboard”

By Peter Koenig – To be sure, the Kiev criminal army does not take prisoners; they kill them on the spot.
Not to mention the hundred Ukrainians killed by the infamous Maidan snipers – by now known to be US paid mercenaries, just a day before the illegal coup d’état of 22 February 2014, that brought to power the current neo-Nazi government.

More and more compassionate people around the world, including from hapless Europe, are becoming restless, asking impatiently – how much longer blood must flow? – When will Russia intervene? – A legitimate question, so it would appear from the outset. Understandably, as the context is simple: the illegal ‘regime change’ was sponsored, paid for and instigated by the US / CIA / NATO / EU – and prepared during more than ten years at a cost of at least 5 billion dollars – as Madame Nuland boasted on several occasions.

This US / EU organized coup is now turning Ukraine, a once prosperous country, the breadbasket of the Soviet Union and the cradle of Russia into chaos, to become easy prey for the usual western money sharks, the IMF, European Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB). Behind them are the FED and Wall Street, to make sure they do as told. No mercy. For starters a US$ 17.5 billion IMF loan with the usual killer strings attached, à la Greece – large-scale privatization of the country’s social safety net, i.e. cutting salaries pensions (in half), food and fuel subsidies, increasing taxes – is rapidly becoming a nightmare for the average citizen and especially the poor.

In addition, a US / NATO sledgehammer style killing machine is launched against the ‘pro-Russian opposition’ movement, now also called the Neo-Rossiia Defense Force (NDF).

So – why is Mr. Putin not speaking up – acting up – saving fellow Russian lives? Why does he seemingly accept the sham election that brought the corrupt and corrupted multi-billionaire, chocolate magnate, Petr Poroshenko to power? – The straw in the wind, that bends to where the money flows?

There is a higher agenda at stake. Full analysis.

How Europe failed voters over Ukraine.

The Ukraine crisis has exposed weakness in the EU’s new foreign policy architecture, according to a new contribution to the “Ukraine in Crisis” series published by the European Council on Foreign Relations. Former German diplomat and ECFR Council member, Volker Stanzel, asks where the European External Action Service has been. He writes “the EEAS was created to provide impetus, why should citizens go out to vote for the European Parliament when they do not see the EU taking the lead in times of real crisis?” .

In another addition to the series, ECFR Senior Policy Fellow Andrew Wilson comments that recent presidential polls in Ukraine showed minimal levels of support for the far right and that the relatively low turnout meant the election was “less geographically lopsided” than had been feared. .

The likely effect of the Ukraine crisis on the Middle East is explored by the Director of ECFR’s Middle East and North Africa Programme. Daniel Levy points out that the Ukraine crisis has been received with a collective “I told you so” in the Middle East. “ The West’s response […] is widely viewed as a vindication of the assessment by friend and foe alike that the West’s global commitment and staying power cannot be relied upon [and] that Western decline is endemic.“ .

Finally, ECFR Research Director Hans Kundnani notes that German business is “torn between tough sanctions against Russia and business as usual”. However he warns that because of Germany’s greater trade with Asia, Berlin would be even more vulnerable to calls for any sanctions against China caused by Beijing’s increasingly assertive foreign policy. .

These four new contributions show that this ambitious strand continues to deliver fresh insights into the Ukraine crisis from Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Russia. .

The “Consequences of Ukraine” series is supported and promoted by events and podcasts in the seven capitals where the ECFR has offices.

Ukraine, Russia, and the China Option

The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) has released a new paper in its Europe Policy Paper Series by Andrew Small, Transatlantic Fellow at GMF, on how the developments in Ukraine affect China’s relationship with the EU and with Russia.

Beijing has sought to take a neutral stance in the stand-off between Russia and the West. But in a crisis that has hinged to an unusual degree on trade deals, loans, energy exports, financial assets, and sanctions, the world’s second largest economy cannot avoid becoming politically embroiled. As the recent $400 billion Sino-Russian energy deal illustrates, China’s economic decisions will inevitably have major implications.

Andrew Small argues that for the European Union and the United States, the question is not whether Beijing will tilt definitively toward one or other party. Rather, it is whether China will prove to be an enabling or a constraining factor for the West’s policies towards Russia.

He warns that the EU and the United States can end up with the worst of all worlds: sanctions that are not strong enough to change Moscow’s behavior or to deter China from further military assertiveness in its own neighborhood, yet just potent enough to push Russia into a closer relationship with China, and to persuade Beijing that it needs to immunize itself against exposure to the Western financial system.

Small identifies opportunities for the EU and the U.S. to leverage China’s growing geo-economic interest in Central and Eastern Europe, where Beijing’s and Moscow’s interests are far from identical. Yet the principal challenge will be navigating China’s role in mitigating the impact of Western sanctions on Russia. Andrew Small: Ukraine, Russia and the China Option, Europe Policy Paper 2/2014

Statement after the trilateral meeting between the EU, Russia and Ukraine on energy security

On Friday (30 May) afternoon a trilateral meeting on energy security between EU Energy Commissioner Oettinger, Russian Energy Minister Novak and Ukrainian Energy Minister Prodan took place in Berlin. Further progress has been achieved. Naftogaz has proved that they have transferred 786 million USD from their account to a corresponding bank. However, given the patterns of the transfer the money has not yet been credited to the Gazprom account. The amount of 786 million USD covers the unpaid invoices for gas delivered in February and March. It is expected that the money will be credited to the Gazprom account by Monday morning. On the basis of that the parties agreed to come together for further discussions on Monday in Brussels. The aim is to find a solution on prices and payment schemes. Source.

The Sanctions Crossroads

by: Dmitri Trenin – Monday, June 2, 2014/ The Ukraine crisis is the first case of overt great-power rivalry since the end of the Cold War. Unlike then, the military and ideological components are no longer central to the confrontation. Economic and information warfare, by contrast, are much more intense, given the new globalized environment. Economic sanctions are the present-day equivalent of war.

The attractiveness of sanctions for those who impose them lies in their asymmetrical nature. At little or no cost to one’s own economy they promise to cripple an adversary and make him change course, or even the regime. Even though the international record of sanctions is far from 100-percent successful, a few cases stand out as inspiring: South Africa under apartheid and Iran today.

When the Obama Administration decided to engage in a sanctions war against Russia, it had in mind a range of objectives. First, to make Moscow back off from Crimea; then, to prevent a Russian military invasion of Ukraine; and most recently, to keep Russia from interfering in the Ukrainian presidential elections. In U.S. domestic terms, the sanctions were meant to provide a convenient political cover to the White House.

To reach those objectives, Washington has sought to achieve the following with the help of sanctions: (a) hurt President Putin’s inner circle of friends and (…) Full analysis.

Targeted Sanctions on Russia Will Work, But Mostly for Vladimir Putin

By Michael Kofman – Targeted or not, Western sanctions will enable the Russian President to produce a political culture that will preserve the spirit of Putinism long after he’s gone.

Using sanctions to influence Russian decision-making in Ukraine is a losing battle. The West has learned no lessons from an entire year of losing battles with Russia in 2013. Deep down Putin likely hopes that U.S. sanctions inconvenience the general Russian public. They are used to being restricted by Moscow, but not by the West. Putin will make sure that the blame is assigned accordingly. His administration has nurtured anti-Americanism, and the U.S. is finally lending some credibility to a perception that Putin has been trying to spread for years. He is clearly willing to accept a long-term shift in U.S.-Russian relations in order to secure Russian interests in Ukraine. Given the importance of the country to Russia, and its low strategic relevance to the West, Moscow calculates that time is on its side. Just like after the 2008 war with Georgia, Western rancor will subside, the sanctions will be lifted, and in a few years they will be back to business as usual.

Of course the sanctions are not completely worthless. Hurting the Russian stock market will eventually force Russian oligarchs to take a haircut on margin calls, but more substantive damage will be caused when major Western investment funds pull out of Russia to protect their corporate image. Once burned, these will take a long time to return. That is the West’s strongest tool.

Investment powerhouses like Blackrock have taken a clear stand against Russia—self-serving but effective. They will do the most damage. A lack of Western investment will hurt Russia, but it is not in Europe’s long-term interest to genuinely damage the Russian economy. It will not restrain Putin now and could make Russia more unstable and difficult to predict under anyone who follows him. Russia will have to accept at least a 1-1.5 percent loss in GDP growth as a consequence, and suffer significant capital outflows.

This is all a small victory. Russia’s economy was going to be in a recession anyway. The West is clumsily shifting the blame from Vladimir Putin to itself. His popularity grows, opinions of the West decline, and Russia’s economy accelerates on an already predictable trajectory. All of this will add up to less Western influence and more broken pieces to pick up at the end of this chapter. These actions are not reducing Russia’s relevance in the world—they are reducing Western relevance in Russia. The U.S. and EU have been dealt a bad hand of cards. Full analysis.

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