The Referendum in Crimea…

Posted on 14 March 2014 by redaksiyon

And Erdogan’s Dilemma

Rusya için Kırım, İngiltere için Falkland Adaları’nın öneminden çok daha önemli

Russia will respect the will of Crimean people in referendum

Rusya’nın Ukrayna’nın güneydoğusunu işgal etme gibi bir niyeti yok

UN Security Council vote Saturday on Ukraine resolution

Lavrov, Kerry Start Ukraine Talks in London

Kırım, referandumla Ukrayna’dan ayrılabilir mi?

***

by BAYRAM BALCI – The Russian intervention in Crimea is considered by many analysts as the most severe crisis between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War. The United States and EU but also all the countries of the former Soviet Union, are particularly concerned by this crisis that could affect them one way or the other. As a member of the West bloc and despite its recurrent attempts to emerge as an autonomous actor on the international scene, Turkey is also concerned by the Crimean crisis for at least two reasons: Tatars of Crimea are or a Turkic origin and as such their fate draws interest in the whole Turkic world, and Turkey is an immediate neighbor to the conflict zone. Should the conflict between Russia and the West over Crimea worsens, Turkey, as a NATO member and controlling power over the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits, could be engulfed in this new crisis. Ankara is facing a real dilemma. Indeed, the choice is going to be tough between solidarity with Crimean Tatar brothers and Ukrainian territorial integrity, while pursuing continued good relations with a much feared but economically powerful neighbor like Russia. As of today, Turkey cannot afford to take a strong position.
The first reason why Turkey is so concerned is because Crimea is the home to a Turkic ethnic population, the Tatars, with whom the Turks share common cultural, linguistic, religious and historical background. From 1441 to 1783, Crimea was a powerful Khanate under Ottoman protectorate. When it fell under Russian domination, local Muslim populations who were the majority, left their homeland and took refuge in Ottoman provinces. Like other Muslim groups who fled from the Russian invasion (…)
The Ukrainian and Crimean crisis are a major challenge for Turkish diplomacy but there is no serious indication that Turkey will stand against Russia. Timing is also involved. The priority for the Turkish government now is to ensure it will survive the corruption scandals and upcoming elections, in which the situation in Crimea is not relevant to Turkish voters. Moreover, the once very assertive and strong Turkish foreign policy vanished after Turkey got trapped in the Syrian crisis. Caution dictates Turkey to align itself with its Western allies. For that matter, the Ukrainian crisis is one more proof of the declining role of Turkish diplomacy in the region and deprives Erdogan’s AKP government from any aspiration to regional leadership. Full analysis.

The Erdogan-Gulen Fight, Now Playing in Washington

Why It Is Not Only the Battle Over Crimea That Will Determine Ukraine’s Future

by KATERYNA PISHCHIKOVA – Russian de facto military occupation of Crimea provoked a flurry of commentary and debates on issues that go beyond the situation in Ukraine: conspiracy theories, laments of Russia’s anti-Western stance, discussions of revamping the transatlantic cooperation, and broader questioning of the future of the liberal world order.
Fears of an open military confrontation with a nuclear power, although not unfounded, seem to have distracted the attention from the extremely delicate post-revolutionary situation in Kyiv. Although the United States and EU have been efficient in shoring up the necessary economic assistance to Ukraine, bilaterally and via IFIs, not sufficient attention is being paid to the post-revolutionary political process.
The hasty departure of President Viktor Yanukovych opened the door toward political change, yet a lot remains to be done to ensure the success of this tentative transition. Comprehensive political reforms and an inclusive and transparent political process are needed to renew and strengthen political institutions and regain legitimacy. As the government is struggling to contain the crisis in Crimea, the broader picture should not be lost from sight. (…)
Ukraine’s territorial integrity remains a grave concern and Russia will continue to play the role of a key spoiler, whatever its next moves in Crimea are. Although Russian behavior puts at high risk the fragile balance in the country, it is Ukraine’s domestic politics that will determine whether the Maidan revolution will become the beginning of a new democratic transition in Ukraine or whether the all too well known dysfunctional and corrupt politics of alternating kleptocracies will prevail over the next months. Full opinion.

Secretary General Statement on the so-called referendum in Ukraine’s autonomous Republic of Crimea

I continue to follow developments in Ukraine with great concern.
The so-called referendum in the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea planned on 16 March would be a direct violation of the Ukrainian constitution and international law. If held, it would have no legal effect or political legitimacy.
Holding this referendum would undermine international efforts to find a peaceful and political solution to the crisis in Ukraine. It would run counter to the principles of the United Nations Charter. It is vital that those principles be upheld.
Today, these concerns have been discussed at a meeting of all 50 members of the Partnership for Peace in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, at the request of our partner Ukraine. Many partners associated themselves with NATO’s concerns.
The Russian Federation should act responsibly, uphold its obligations under international law and abide by the principles of the NATO-Russia Council and the Partnership for Peace. Dialogue and negotiations should be given a chance to succeed in bringing about a de-escalation of the situation and a political solution.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL
Monday 17 March 2014 in Brussels

The Council, starting at 9.30, will be chaired by Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
The Council will kick-off with a debate on the situation in Ukraine and the EU’s Eastern Partnership more generally. An exchange of views on Bosnia and Herzegovina will follow.
Ministers will then discuss how best to support on-going efforts in the Middle East peace process.
The Council will then address developments related to the crisis in Syria and its regional context.
After that, it will turn to the EU-Africa summit, to be held on 2/3 April in Brussels.
Over lunch, ministers will hold a discussion on energy diplomacy, in the presence of Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger.
The High Representative is also expected to shortly de-brief ministers on her recent visit to Iran, at the start of the meeting.
The EU-Uzbekistan Co-operation Council will start at 16.30

Ukraine and Eastern Partnership

The Council will take stock of developments in the Ukraine and follow-up on the extraordinary
meeting of EU Heads of State and Government on 6 March and on the extraordinary FAC of 3 March. Ministers will discuss an EU response to the developments, ahead of a meeting of the European Council on 20/21 March. Wider issues related to the EU’s Eastern Partnership may also
be raised during the debate.
At their extraordinary meeting on 6 March, EU Heads of State or Government strongly condemned the violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity by the Russian Federation and called for an immediate withdrawal of armed forces to their areas of permanent stationing. They also
considered the decision to hold a referendum on the future status of the Crimea contrary to the Ukrainian constitution and therefore illegal.
For the EU, the solution to the crisis in Ukraine must be based on the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Such a solution should be found through negotiations between Ukraine and the Russia federation, for instance through a so-called “contact group”.
At the same time, leaders decided to take action. They suspended bilateral talks with the Russian Federation on visa matters as well as talks on a new EU-Russia agreement. European G8 members and the EU have also suspended their participation in the preparations for the G8 summit in June in Sotchi.
Moreover, in the absence of talks between the governments of Ukraine and Russia and if they do not produce results in a limited timeframe, the EU will decide on additional measures, leaders stated. Preparatory work on such measures has been on-going.
Leaders also agreed that further steps by Russia to destabilise the situation in Ukraine would lead to additional and far reaching consequences for relations between the EU (and its member states) and the Russian Federation in a broad range of economic areas.
Heads of State and Government welcomed a package of support measures presented by the Commission last week, including overall support of at least € 11 billion over the coming years from the EU budget and EU-based international financial institutions. It also comprises the granting of
autonomous trade preferences to Ukraine so as to advance the application of certain provisions of the Association Agreement on a deep and comprehensive free trade area.
Leaders in addition decided to sign very shortly the political chapters of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement while reiterating their commitment to sign the full agreement including the deep and comprehensive free trade area. See statement by the Heads of State or Government
and factsheet on EU-Ukraine relations.
The Association Agreements with Moldova and Georgia were initialled at the Vilnius Eastern Partnership summit in November 2013. Their signature is to take place as soon as possible and before the end of August 2014. See European Council conclusions of December 2013 (para 47).
The EU’s Eastern Partnership was launched at the Prague summit in May 2009. It concerns six Eastern partner countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. Its objectives include accelerating political association and deepening economic
integration with the Eastern European partner countries. The EU supports reforms in the partner countries aimed at consolidating democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and an open market economy. At the same time, it offers gradual integration into the European economy,
greater mobility for citizens and closer political ties. Between 2010 and 2013, EUR 1.9 billion were allocated to support its implementation.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Council will discuss the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The High Representative will
brief ministers about her recent trip to Sarajevo where she discussed the situation with politicians and members of civil society. See her statement at the conclusion of the trip.
In October 2013, the Council expressed its serious concern at the on-going failure of the Bosnia and Herzegovina political leaders to implement the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the Sejdić/Finci case and stressed that the current lack of a solution is preventing Bosnia and
Herzegovina from further progress towards the EU. It also reiterated its unequivocal support for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU perspective as a sovereign and united country enjoying full territorial integrity. See Council conclusions.

Middle East peace process

The Council will discuss the Middle East peace process. The High Representative will brief ministers on what the EU can do to support the talks.
The EU fully supports the on-going efforts of the parties and of the US. In December 2013, the Council reiterated the EU’s readiness to contribute substantially to post-conflict arrangements for ensuring the sustainability of a peace agreement. “The EU will provide an unprecedented package
of European political, economic and security support to both parties in the context of a final status agreement,” the Council said in conclusions. The on-going work to define the details of the EU’s offer will be the subject of the debate by ministers. See Council conclusions of 16 December 2013.

Syrian conflict and regional context

The Council will consider the latest developments in the Syrian conflict, in particular the
humanitarian situation following the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution on the humanitarian situation on 22 February, the growing terrorist threat and the state of play in diplomatic efforts to bring an end to the crisis.
For the EU, the only solution to the conflict is a genuine political transition, based on the full implementation of the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012, and preserving the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria.
The EU and its member states have been quick to support the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. The EU is the largest financial contributor to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and supports its work towards the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile, including through the provision of armoured vehicles and satellite imagery.
Individual member states have also provided resources to assist the destruction programme.
The EU and its member states are the largest humanitarian donor for the Syrian crisis. The total response from EU and member states to the crisis stands now at € 2.6 billion.
For more details on EU positions and restrictive measures, see factsheet European Union and Syria.

EU-Africa summit

The Council will be briefed about preparations for the 4th EU-Africa summit, which is to take place
in Brussels on the 2-3 April under the theme “Investing in people, prosperity and peace”. The European Council of 20/21 March will also discuss the summit preparations.
The EU-Africa summit will bring together the Heads of State and Government of the European Union and the African continent, together with the EU and African Union institutions. It will illustrate how EU-Africa relations have evolved over the past years, based on the Joint Africa-EU Strategy of
2007, which established a partnership of equals going beyond development to tackle challenges of common interest, including political, economic, investment and trade issues.
Leaders will discuss ways to deepen co-operation under the three areas identified in the summit theme, i.e. people, prosperity and peace. They will also address investment, climate change, prosperity, and ways for stimulating growth and create jobs, and will take stock of ongoing and
future cooperation in the various fields covered by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. The issue of migration as well as peace and security cooperation will also be on the agenda.
For more information, see the website of the EU-Africa summit..

Energy diplomacy

Over lunch, ministers will exchange views on EU energy diplomacy, in the presence of Energy
Commissioner Günther Oettinger. Ministers are set to discuss the foreign policy implications of strategic choices made in the field of energy by relevant partners.
The shift in the global energy landscape creates new challenges and opportunities for EU foreign and security policy. The shale gas revolution in the US, the growing demand for energy in India due to its increasing population and the rise of gas as a source in China might have far-reaching
political and economic consequences.
The debate follows previous exchanges among EU leaders and ministers about the external dimension of EU energy policy. The European Council of February 2011 asked the High Representative to take full account of the energy security dimension in her work and to reflect energy security in the EU’s neighbourhood policy.

Other items

The Council is set to adopt several other items without discussion, including:

– European aid volunteers initiative

The Council is set to establish a European voluntary humanitarian aid corps which sets out a
framework for joint contributions from European volunteers to support and complement humanitarian aid operations worldwide, as provided for in the Lisbon Treaty. See also legal text.

– Gulf of Guinea

The Council is due to adopt an EU strategy on the Gulf of Guinea, to support the efforts of the
region and its coastal states to address the many challenges of maritime insecurity and organised crime. EU action will focus on four objectives: building a common understanding of the scale of the
threat in the Gulf of Guinea and the need to address it; helping regional governments put in place institutions and capabilities to ensure security and the rule of law; supporting the development of prosperous economies in the coastal countries; strengthening cooperation structures between the
countries of the region to ensure effective action across borders at sea and on land. The Council is to invite the EEAS and the Commission to put forward the actions necessary to deliver the strategy and report back annually on progress made.

– EU strategy for security and development in the Sahel

The Council is to adopt conclusions on the implementation of the EU strategy for security and
development in the Sahel. The Council is set to welcome the progress made in implementing the strategy that it adopted in March 2011 and reaffirm the EU’s objectives in the fields of security, development, peace-building, conflict prevention and countering violent extremism. It will invite the
Commission and the EEAS to extend the implementation of the strategy to Burkina Faso and Chad while intensifying activities in Mali, Mauretania and Niger.

– EUCAP Mali

The Council is likely to adopt a crisis management concept for a civilian mission under the
Common Security and Defence Policy to assist the internal security forces in Mali (EUCAP Mali) so as to enable the Malian state to ensure law and order as well as fight against terrorists, organised
crime and cross-border trafficking. Once established, EUCAP Mali would deliver strategic advice and training for managers of the three internal security forces in Mali, i.e. the police, Gendarmerie
and Garde nationale. A separate legal act – currently under preparation – is required for the mission to be formally set up.

– West Africa EPA development programme

The Council is set to adopt conclusions on West Africa’s Economic Partnership Agreement
development programme (PAPED). In the period from 2015 to 2020, the EU is committed to provide at least € 6.5 billion for activities linked to the PAPED. This is to be delivered through the European Development Fund, relevant instruments of the EU budget, contributions from member
states and the European Investment Bank. See draft Council conclusions.

– South Sudan

The Council is to adopt conclusions on South Sudan, expressing its deep concern about the ongoing
crisis in South Sudan, the grave human suffering it causes and its regional implications. It will call on all parties to immediately stop the violence and honour the Cessation of Hostilities agreement signed on 23 January. The EU firmly supports the mediation led by the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development.

– Central African Republic

The Council is due to adopt conclusions on the Central African Republic, encouraging the current
authorities to continue the political transition. The EU is the main humanitarian and development partner of the Central African Republic. For more information, see fact sheet..

U.S. Support for Ukraine

SECRETARY KERRY: Good afternoon, everybody. President Obama, as you know, asked me to come to London in an effort to try to deescalate the situation in Ukraine. Today, Foreign Minister Lavrov and I engaged in a very in-depth, constructive dialogue on how to address legitimate concerns in the context of a unified, sovereign Ukraine. The United States strongly supports the interim government of Ukraine, and we continue to favor a direct dialogue between Ukraine and Russia as the very best way to try to resolve the crisis.
I came here in good faith with constructive ideas – which we did put forward, on behalf of President Obama – in order to try to restore and respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, while addressing at the same time Russia’s legitimate concerns. Foreign Minister Lavrov and I talked for a good six hours, and the conversation was very direct, very candid, frank, and I say constructive because we really dug into all of Russia’s perceptions, their narrative, our narrative, our perceptions, and the differences between us.
I presented a number of ideas on behalf of the President, which we believe absolutely could provide a path forward for all the parties. However, after much discussion, the Foreign Minister made it clear that President Putin is not prepared to make any decision regarding Ukraine until after the referendum on Sunday. The United States position on that referendum, I must say, is clear and it’s clear today: We believe the referendum is contrary to the constitution of Ukraine, is contrary to international law, is in violation of that law, and we believe it is illegitimate, and as the President put it, illegal under the Ukrainian constitution. Neither we nor the international community will recognize the results of this referendum.
And we also remain deeply concerned about the large deployments of Russian forces in Crimea and along the eastern border with Russia, as well as the continuing provocations and some of the hooliganism of young people who’ve been attracted to cross the border and come into the east, as well as some of those who’ve lived there.
I was clear with Foreign Minister Lavrov that the President has made it clear there will be consequences if Russia does not find a way to change course. And we don’t say that as a threat, we say that as a direct consequence of the choices that Russia may or may not choose to make here. If Russia does establish facts on the ground that increase tensions or that threaten the Ukrainian people, then obviously that will beg an even greater response, and there will be costs.
President Obama and I could not be more convinced that there is a better way for Russia to pursue legitimate interests in Ukraine. We believe it is not insignificant that we acknowledge there are legitimate interests – historical, cultural, current strategic. These are real interests, and I think all of us who are joined together in the EU and extended contact group understand those interests and are prepared to respect them. But that requires also that Russia would respect the multilateral structure that has guided our actions since World War II and the need for all of us to try to resolve this challenge and to meet those interests through the international, multilateral legal norms, which should guide all of our behavior.
Foreign Minister Lavrov and I talked about that, and we talked about the other options that are available – options of dialogue, options of various contact meetings that could take place, options of international legal remedy, options of joint, multilateral efforts that would protect minorities, UN options, international human rights organization options, many options for the ways in which any challenges to the safety or security or rights of people could be addressed. We are certainly prepared to join in an effort to protect those rights, whether they be the rights of a Ukrainian living in the west, a Ukrainian living in the east, somebody of Russian language and Russian descent who might feel threatened. All minorities, all people should be protected.
Foreign Minister Lavrov and I agreed that we are going to stay in touch in the next days on Ukraine, as well as on the other issues of concern, which we are working on – Syria, Iran, and other challenges of mutual concern.
Before I close, I just want to reiterate what President Obama said in the Oval Office on Wednesday when he visited with Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk. The United States stands with the people of Ukraine in their desire to make their own choices about their future, and to be able to live their lives in a unified, peaceful, stable, and democratic Ukraine. The President said clearly that is our only interest. That is what drives us. Not a larger strategy, nothing with respect to Russia directly. We are interested in the people of Ukraine having the opportunity to have their country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity respected, as we would ask that to happen for any country.
So I will be briefing Prime Minister Yatsenyuk shortly, as well as all of our colleagues and counterparts in the EU and the members of the contact group. As soon as I leave here, I will engage in those briefings, and I look forward to taking a couple of questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as you noted, Russian troops are carrying out an extensive military exercise near Ukraine, and at the same time, the Russian Foreign Ministry said just today that the Kremlin reserves the right to protect what it calls compatriots’ lives in Ukraine. Did you obtain a clear assurance from Mr. Lavrov that Russia would not use these forces to intervene in eastern Ukraine? What – as they have in Crimea. What did they say is the purpose of this exercise? And has Russia abided by its obligations to provide OSCE nations with timely and accurate information about the size of the exercise, the types of forces involved, the purpose of the exercise? Have they done that for this current exercise and have they done that for the one immediate prior?

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, let me answer the second part of the question first. I don’t know whether or not they’ve made that notification. I’ve been wrapped up in these talks and I’ve been wrapped up in other talks, so I’m not aware of whether or not that notification was made.
But I can tell you, indeed, we talked about these exercises and we talked about the level of troops that are deployed, where they’re deployed, what the purpose is, and I raised very clearly the increased anxiety that is created within Ukraine as a consequence of this. And we talked about one of the proposals that we made – I’m not going to go into all of them, but one of the proposals we made discussed the possibility of drawing all forces back, reducing these tensions, returning to barracks, having a freeze on those kinds of deployments while the diplomacy is working.
I think, in fairness, that Foreign Minister Lavrov is going to report that proposal back to President Putin, as he did all – as he will all of the proposals that we put on the table this afternoon. He’s going to fly back, have that discussion with him, so the president will be well aware – President Putin – of all of the options that we’ve offered. But that was certainly one of the principal areas of discussion is this increased tension created by these additional deployments in Crimea as well as along the border of the east, and the need to try to reduce that kind of tension. And it’s our hope that they will take those necessary steps.
With respect to assurances, it’s my understanding this afternoon that Foreign Minister Lavrov gave assurances publicly with respect to their intent, but I think all of us would like to see actions, not words, that support the notion that people are moving in the opposite direction and, in fact, diminishing their presence. And I think right now, in this particular climate, given what has been happening, we really need to hear a more declarative policy in order to make clear where Russia is proceeding with respect to these troops and these exercises.

QUESTION: Thank you. Mr. Secretary, you said last week that Crimea is Ukraine. Foreign Minister Lavrov just told reporters that Crimea is more important to Russia than Falklands is to Britain. Given that, did you get any indication from Mr. Lavrov that Russia would not annex Crimea in the event of a vote to secede? And if not, or even if so, why wouldn’t even greater autonomy for Crimea, as Kyiv said it will allow, why would it not set a dangerous precedent for the rest of the region in terms of appeasing Russia?

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, the issue of additional autonomy for Crimea has been one that has constantly been on the table – been on the table. It’s been on the table prior to Russia making these moves. So that’s really a decision for the Ukrainian Government to make, number one. Number two, in his visit to Washington, Prime Minister Yatsenyuk made it very clear they are prepared to provide additional autonomy, and they see that as no threat to the integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. They in fact, I think, see it as strengthening it. But we don’t know definitively what President Putin is going to decide.
What was made clear today in the context of President Putin being unwilling to make any decisions regarding the next steps until the vote has been taken – what was made clear is that he has said that once that referendum vote is taken, he will make a decision with respect to what will happen. And I would say to him today, as I said to Foreign Minister Lavrov, that is a decision of enormous consequence with respect to the global community. We believe that a decision to move forward by Russia to ratify that vote officially within the Duma would in fact be a backdoor annexation of Crimea, and that it would be against international law, and frankly, fly in the face of every legitimate effort to try to reach out to Russia and others to say there is a different way to proceed, to protect the interests of Crimeans, to protect Russia’s interests, and to respect the integrity of Ukraine and the sovereignty of Ukraine.
We hope President Putin will recognize that none of what we’re saying is meant as a threat. It’s not meant as a – in a personal way. It is meant as a matter of respect for the international multilateral structure that we have lived by since World War II and for the standards of behavior about annexation, about secession, about independence and how countries come about it.
Here in Great Britain, the Parliament voted to legitimize a vote in Scotland about where Scotland would want to proceed. Under the constitution of Ukraine, the Ukrainian legislature in Kyiv would have to vote to legitimize a secession effort by any state or oblast or province or entity or autonomy – autonomous region of Ukraine. That hasn’t happened here. That’s why this runs against the constitution of Ukraine.
So we very much hope that President Putin will hear that we are not trying to challenge Russia’s rights or interests, it’s interest in protecting its people, its interests in its strategic position, its port agreement. None of those things are being threatened here. They can all be respected even as the integrity of Ukraine is respected, and we would hope that President Putin would see that there is a better way to address those concerns that he has that are legitimate, and we hope he will make that decision. He has decided not to make any other decision until that vote takes place on Sunday.

QUESTION: Thank you. Mr. Secretary, Foreign Minister Lavrov just told reporters in London after your talks that there’s no common vision between the West and Russia on Ukraine, that international mediators are not needed in this situation, and that Russia will respect the results of Sunday’s referendum in Crimea. Despite your message just now to President Putin that this is not meant as a threat, do you believe that in fact that diplomacy is failing here and that they are just going to go ahead with what you just termed as a possible backdoor annexation of Crimea?
And is it now a fait accompli that on Monday we will see sanctions from the European Union and the United States? And what gives you confidence that even those sanctions will in any way change President Putin’s mind, given that this week we’ve seen the ruble falling and today again the Moscow stocks have been falling to a four-year low? Thank you.

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, I suspect the market in Russia, in Moscow, can be significantly affected by these choices. It already is being affected. And obviously, if there are going to be more sanctions, I think that’ll have an impact. But the reality is that President Putin’s statement that he will respect the vote offers him many options as to how he chooses to respect the vote. If the people of Crimea vote overwhelmingly, as one suspects they will, to affiliate or be associated with Russia, you can respect the vote by making sure that their autonomy is increased, that their needs that have prompted that vote are properly respected, without necessarily having to make a decision to annex.
So until that decision is made, I’m not going to interpret what it may or may not mean. I think it’s more important for the president – for President Putin to understand that we are prepared to respect his interests and rights, and that they can be fully respected, and that he can actually have a claim to have served his purpose of protecting the people that he is interested in protecting by augmenting their rights and by asserting his prerogatives at the end of this effort. So there are other options, and that’s what we’re continually trying to say. And until he has made his decision, those options are still on the table and alive, and we hope he will make a different set of choices.
With respect to – what was the other part of your question about the —

QUESTION: Whether there’ll be sanctions automatically —

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, with respect to the President and the European Community and everybody have said if the referendum takes place, there will be some sanctions. There’ll be some response, put it that way. If there’s greater diplomatic opportunity that could be pursued, and that is in fact on the table, then I’m confident whatever the response is would be calibrated accordingly. But if, on the other hand, a decision is made that’s negative and/or flies in the face of all of the rationale that the EU and others have put on the table for illegality, that will obviously demand some further response, which I’m confident both the EU and the United States will produce.
It is not our preference. It is not where we want to go. It is not what we are choosing as a first choice. But if the wrong choices are made, then there will be no choice but to respond appropriately because of the gravity of this breach of international standard, breach of international law, and challenge, frankly, to the global standard by which nations have been called on to try to behave.
And we believe that the consequences are consequences that could be felt in many other parts of the world. There are many places where people might take the wrong lesson from that, and I think many people are concerned about that. Source.

U.S. Preps for Russian Retaliation

Background Briefing befor Kerry – Lavrov meeting.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: So as you know, Secretary Kerry has been engaging, as have Europeans, with Foreign Minister Lavrov for more than a week to see if we could support a de-escalation of the situation in Ukraine, a political solution, a negotiated way out, an off-ramp. A number of you were on the trip in Paris and in Rome, where Secretary Kerry was joined by some 10 other foreign ministers and international representatives who could conceivably form a contact group of countries who could support direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, if that’s possible.
You’ll recall that last week the Russians were not willing to sit down directly with the Ukrainians, saying that they didn’t recognize this government. So instead, the contact group ministers met with the Russians, then they met with the Ukrainians, but no progress was made there. And the Russians did not have – Foreign Minister Lavrov didn’t – wasn’t really empowered, didn’t really have much room to negotiate.
Then over the course of this past week, as you know, we thought we would try again by sending the Russians a list of questions, first with regard to whether they would set the environment for talks, whether they would stop the facts on the ground that they are creating both by supporting the Crimean referendum and by the military pressure and the pressure from security irregulars that they’re bringing to bear on Ukraine, and then secondarily to explore whether some of these ideas for de-escalation might be something that they would engage on, ideas like withdrawing Russian troops back to barracks and in their place putting in OSCE or UN monitors, support for a demobilization initiative on the ground in Kyiv and other cities where there are still irregulars and too many weapons, supported by the OSCE, the UN. So we had a whole list of things and we asked the Russians specifically whether they would engage.
The answer that we got back in written form was basically a restatement of all of the positions that we had heard in London and Paris, with some pretty specious legal argumentation about how Crimea and Kosovo are the same thing.
Secretary Kerry said, “Look, we haven’t made any progress here, but I’m willing to keep trying.” You’ll recall that the previous week – I guess it was over the previous weekend – the President spoke to Putin. They agreed that Lavrov and Kerry would keep trying. Then when Lavrov called him, he said, “Hey, why don’t you go to Sochi and see Putin?” We got back and said that Secretary Kerry could not – would not do that if there wasn’t any – some traction between them.
So Secretary Kerry called him again on Tuesday and said, “Look, we haven’t made any progress here, but I am still willing to come and try and talk with you, but you need to get some flexibility. And by the way, we have Prime Minister Yatsenyuk of Ukraine coming for the President’s invitation on Wednesday. They’ve been saying the right things about being willing to offer a lot of autonomy, being willing to offer a lot of international support to protect minorities and human rights, et cetera. We’re going to explore that with Yansenyuk and we’ll see how that might be articulated and detailed. So why don’t we think about trying to meet at the end of the week?” Kerry offered yesterday; Lavrov had to be on Sochi to see Putin today. So they ended up at Friday, and so we will meet him tomorrow.
We were quite gratified by the positions that Prime Minister Yatsenyuk took. You heard him publicly. He made clear that they want to negotiate, that they want a political solution, that they believe that with international support this could be de-escalated; that if there are legitimate concerns about minority rights, about security of the bases, they’d be delighted to have international observers in and international support in; that they are prepared to work with Russia on any outstanding issues either directly bilaterally or with the support of a contact group. He said again in the meeting with the President, publicly afterwards, at the Atlantic Council, that they’re prepared to consider highest possible degree of autonomy for Crimea inside of Ukraine, but what they will not do is sacrifice the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine.
So with all of that in hand and a lot of good consultations, Secretary Kerry will give this a try again tomorrow. You’ll recall that the referendum on Crimea’s status that we and the G7 and most of the international community consider illegal and invalid is set to take place on Sunday. Again, this is another step that does not improve the environment for discussion, so the first that Secretary Kerry will say is use your influence to buy space for a time and space for negotiations to take place.
That said, Crimeans seem bound and determined to go forward with this. It will not have force of law in Ukraine. It will not have force of law in Russia or anywhere in the international community in and of itself. But we will be interested also to hear from Foreign Minister Lavrov how Russia sees this as it bears down.
I want to call your attention also to a very, very strong statement issued by the G7 countries yesterday – it’s their second statement in two weeks – making clear that any annexation of Crimea would be unrecognized, illegal, invalid, in their eyes, as would the results of this referendum, which I’ll remind you the President called slap-dash and illegal yesterday.
Again, we need to give – we are going to give diplomacy every chance. We are going to present within the context of a unified, sovereign Ukraine the best offer for de-escalation that the Ukrainian people can accept and see if Russia is prepared to take that off-ramp. This is a matter of giving diplomacy every chance to succeed, and if the Russians choose not to take that course, if President Putin chooses not to avail himself of that opportunity, then, as the President has said, there will be costs. There have already been costs, but there will be more costs. Full transcript.

U.S. Mission to the United Nations: Remarks At A Security Council Stakeout on Ukraine

Ambassador Power: Hi everybody. Thanks for joining us today. I’d like to start by welcoming Prime Minister Yatsenyuk – who I know has just departed – and thanking him for joining the Security Council today and for his timely and moving briefing. We just heard the prime minister speak to the future Ukraine wishes for itself and for its people – a future in which they do not have to choose between east and west.
Importantly, we heard the prime minister prioritize internal reconciliation, plans for free and fair elections and political inclusivity, including the proposal to create a task force to consider the possibility of enhanced autonomy for Crimea within Ukraine. These are the actions and dispositions of a government committed to the rule of law and focused on finding a peaceful way forward.
We also heard another country’s vision for Ukraine. If the May 25th elections offer an opportunity under the law for all Ukrainians to participate in charting their shared future, Sunday’s referendum in Crimea, by contrast, is illegal, unjustified, and divisive. It will be administered under the barrel of a gun rather than under the eyes of international observers. And it presents a laughably cynical false choice between joining Russia now or joining Russia later.
Any referendum on Crimea must be conducted within the bounds of Ukrainian law and the United States joins with others in calling for its suspension. We also call on the Russian Federation to halt its military intervention and refrain from any further actions in support of this illegitimate and destabilizing effort.
We are at a critical moment, as you heard from all Council members. The way forward is clear. Russian forces must return to their bases. International human rights monitors must be allowed into Crimea. And all countries must respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity. It is not too late, but we are running out of time. Full transcript.

UK offer assistance to US and Russia in finding diplomatic breakthrough to Ukraine crisis.

Speaking to media today (Friday 14 March) Foreign Secretary William Hague said:
These talks in London this morning are a vital moment in what is clearly the most serious crisis in Europe in the 21st century so far, and we have welcomed Secretary Kerry and Foreign Minister Lavrov to London this morning. The Prime Minister and I had breakfast with Secretary Kerry, and I’ve also had a meeting with Foreign Minister Lavrov and we’ve offered them any assistance and support they need through the day.
This is an urgent moment in this crisis. It’s urgent for two reasons: firstly, because it’s a tense and dangerous situation between Russia and Ukraine. There have been many military deployments, obviously, by Russia, particularly in the Crimea, and that has created a situation of great tension.
It’s also urgent because the planned referendum for the Crimea takes place this Sunday. And this is a referendum which doesn’t meet any international norms or standards; it’s taking place without a campaign, without an electoral roll, without the political leaders of the country being able to visit, in the presence of many thousands of troops from a foreign country. It’s not a referendum that any of us can recognise as any normal part of democracy, and holding that this Sunday has, in effect, created a diplomatic deadline for these talks before other measures need to be taken.
We have encouraged both Secretary Kerry and Foreign Minister Lavrov in their work; encouraged them to find today a diplomatic breakthrough, a way of de-escalating tensions. I think, from talking to them this morning, they both have a serious commitment to try to do that. But the fact that so far Russia hasn’t taken any actual action to de-escalate tensions makes this a formidably difficult task today, and I think therefore we have to be realistic about that. In the absence of progress today the European Union, including the United Kingdom, will move to further measures, as we have already agreed, if this referendum goes ahead and no diplomatic way forward is found, and we will meet as EU foreign ministers on Monday in Brussels to discuss the next step. But for these next few hours here in London, every effort will be made to find a diplomatic way forward to de-escalate these tensions that have risen for so long. Source.

Committee of Ministers decides on measures for Ukraine and expresses grave concern on proposed referendum

Strasbourg, 14.03.2014 – In a decision adopted today, the Council of Europe’s Ministers’ Deputies reiterated their solidarity with Ukraine and its people. They underlined the importance of maintaining the efforts towards a political solution in the country and the contribution of the Council of Europe to that end. They also expressed grave concern regarding the intention to hold a referendum in Crimea and welcomed the Secretary General’s decision to submit the question of the referendum to the Venice Commission.
Following a request by Ukraine, the Committee of Ministers instructed the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities to review, in the light of recent developments, the situation of national minorities in Ukraine and to report back on its findings as soon as possible.
The Committee also welcomed the establishment of a tripartite working party involving the Parliament and the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine and the Council of Europe, to bring forward the legislative reforms.
Welcoming the decision, Council of Europe Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland stressed that “protecting the rights of all minorities is indispensable for securing the unity, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine”.

Interim measure granted in inter-State case brought by Ukraine against Russia

On 13 March 2014 the Government of Ukraine lodged an inter-State application under Article 33 (Inter-State cases) of the European Convention on Human Rights against the Russian Federation.
They also submitted a request under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for an interim measure indicating to the Russian Government, among other things, that it should refrain from measures which might threaten the life and health of the civilian population on the territory of Ukraine.
Considering that the current situation gives rise to a continuing risk of serious violations of the European Convention, the President of the Third Section has decided to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. With a view to preventing such violations and pursuant to Rule 39, the President calls upon both Contracting Parties concerned to refrain from taking any measures, in particular military actions, which might entail breaches of the Convention rights of the civilian population, including
putting their life and health at risk, and to comply with their engagements under the Convention, notably in respect of Articles 2 (right to life) and 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment).
Both States were also asked to inform the Court as soon as possible of the measures taken to ensure that the Convention is fully complied with.
Under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court the Court may indicate to the parties of any interim measure which it considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings before it.
The inter-State application has been registered under no. 20958/14, Ukraine v. Russia. Source.

Didier Reynders préoccupé par les développements en Ukraine

Le Vice-Premier Ministre et Ministre des Affaires étrangères Didier Reynders suit de près et avec grande préoccupation les développements en Ukraine, en particulier le référendum sur un rattachement de la Crimée à la Fédération de Russie. La tenue de ce référendum est annoncé pour dimanche 16 mars.
Conformément aux messages délivrés lors de sa récente visite avec ses homologues du Benelux à Kiev, il appelle les responsables de la région à la raison et à prendre les décisions conformes au droit international afin de contribuer à une ‘déescalade’ de la crise.
Le Ministre réitère son plein soutien aux conclusions du Conseil européen du 6 mars. Le Sommet a fermement condamné la violation manifeste de la souveraineté et de l’intégrité territoriale de l’Ukraine par la Fédération russe. Il rappelle qu’en vertu de la Constitution ukrainienne, la République autonome de Crimée ne peut organiser de référendum que sur des questions locales et non sur la modification de la configuration territoriale de l’Ukraine. Ce référendum ne peut dès lors avoir d’effet légal.
Pour la Belgique, il est indispensable de respecter la souveraineté et l’intégrité territoriale de l’Ukraine comme base d’un règlement pacifique de la crise actuelle, dans le strict respect des principes et des obligations prévus par le droit international. Elle rappelle être aux côtés de l’Union européenne et des autres acteurs internationaux pour faciliter et promouvoir tout dialogue constructif avec l’ensemble des parties afin de parvenir à une solution pacifique.

Didier Reynders bezorgd om ontwikkelingen in Oekraïne

Vicepremier en minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Didier Reynders volgt met bezorgdheid de ontwikkelingen in Oekraïne op de voet. Zeker het referendum in de Krim over de aansluiting van het schiereiland aan Rusland. Dat referendum wordt nu zondag 16 maart gehouden.
Net zoals tijdens zijn recente bezoek met zijn collega’s van de Benelux-landen roept hij de leiders van de regio op tot rede. Hij vraagt ze om in overeenstemming met het internationale recht te handelen. Zo kunnen ze aan een de-escalatie van de crisis meewerken.
De minister herhaalt zijn steun voor de conclusies van de Europese Raad van 6 maart. De Top veroordeelde de flagrante schending van de soevereiniteit en de territoriale integriteit van Oekraïne door de Russische Federatie. Didier Reynders herinnert eraan dat volgens de grondwet van Oekraïne de autonome Republiek van de Krim alleen een referendum kan organiseren over lokale aangelegenheden en niet over de territoriale samenstelling van Oekraïne. Het referendum heeft dus geen wettelijke basis.
Voor België is het belangrijk om de soevereiniteit en de territoriale integriteit van Oekraïne te respecteren als basis voor een vreedzame oplossing voor de crisis. Daarbij moeten de beginselen en verplichtingen van het internationale recht strikt worden nageleefd. België wil net als de Europese Unie en andere internationale betrokkenen een dialoog tussen alle partijen vergemakkelijken en bevorderen om tot een vreedzame oplossing te komen.

Didier Reynders concerned about developments in Ukraine

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Didier Reynders, is monitoring the developments in Ukraine closely and with great concern, in particular the referendum on bringing Crimea under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. The referendum will be held this Sunday, 16 March.
In keeping with the messages delivered during his recent visit to Kiev with his counterparts from the Benelux countries, Minister Reynders is calling the leaders of the region to reason. He urges them to make decisions in compliance with international law. This way they can contribute to a de-escalation of the crisis.
The Minister reiterates his full support for the conclusions of the European Council of 6 March. The Summit strongly condemned the blatant violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by the Russian Federation. Didier Reynders recalls that under the terms of the Ukrainian Constitution, the autonomous Republic of Crimea can organise referenda only on local questions and not on an alteration of the territorial configuration of Ukraine. This referendum can therefore have no legal effect.
For Belgium, it is essential that Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity be respected as the basis of a peaceful settlement of the current crisis, with the strictest respect of the principles and obligations enshrined in international law. Belgium stands by the European Union and other international stakeholders to facilitate and promote a constructive dialogue with all the parties in order to reach a peaceful solution.

Russian policy towards Ukraine: not just Crimea

There is no doubt that both the decision to bring forward the date for the referendum on the status of Crimea, and the declaration of independence by the Crimean parliament, were inspired by Russia. The Russian Foreign Ministry stated on 11 March that the Crimean declaration of independence was legally valid, and that Russia would recognise the results of the referendum. In parallel with the efforts to annex Crimea, the Russian authorities have also been devising the legal instruments which will allow it to act more broadly in Ukraine and throughout the post-Soviet area. On 6 March the Russian government approved a bill to simplify the acquisition of Russian citizenship, allowing Russian-speaking foreigners (also in practice including the majority of Ukrainians) to apply for citizenship or right of residence in Russia on an expedited basis. At the same time Moscow has taken a harsher line towards the current government of Ukraine, which was particularly strongly expressed by the statement made by Viktor Yanukovych in Rostov-on-Don, where he very sharply questioned the legitimacy of the current government of Ukraine, declared the de facto disintegration of Ukraine, and promised his return to Kyiv.
By raising the tension on Crimea, Russia wants to increase pressure on the West and the Ukrainian authorities, in order to force them to take Moscow’s opinions on the future shape of Ukraine’s political system and on the personal composition of the Ukrainian government institutions into account. It is very likely that Russia will recognise the independence of Crimea; Moscow’s next step may be to incorporate it into the Russian Federation. However, it is possible that the Kremlin will postpone the formal annexation of Crimea into the Russian Federation in order to use the issue of the peninsula’s status as a means of influencing the authorities in Kyiv; and to foster efforts to form pro-Russian ruling bodies in eastern and southern Ukraine. Moscow has consistently worked to deprive the current Ukrainian authorities of international legitimacy, and to create a new government which would be favourably inclined towards Russia. At the same time, it seems that at present Moscow is having great difficulty finding a political force in Ukraine that could guarantee its interests, which is why it is seeking to delay the presidential elections scheduled for 25 May. The Kremlin has indicated, most strongly in the speech by Viktor Yanukovych, that it will try to sabotage the elections, and even if they are held, it will not recognise the winner as president. Full analysis.

Ukraine’s Oligarchs Will Play a Decisive Role

Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union was followed by the privatization of state-owned assets, giving birth to a powerful class of business leaders known as oligarchs. Since the country’s founding, they have played a crucial role in the political system — there are close ties between Ukraine’s oligarchs and the evolution of the country’s political crisis. This was most recently illustrated in Donetsk on March 9, when Ukrainian presidential hopeful Vitali Klitschko met with Rinat Akhmetov, the country’s richest man, to discuss the ongoing situation.
The oligarchs function as a bridge between the Western-leaning interim government and Russia’s interests in the country, especially in the Ukrainian east. They will play a key role in negotiations over Ukraine’s political future and will prove pivotal in shaping any Ukrainian administration’s relationship with Russia.
Similar to Russia, the rapid transition to capitalism in Ukraine allowed politically connected individuals to amass tremendous wealth as they acquired and monopolized assets spanning the country’s metals, chemicals and energy distribution industries, among others. But Russia has a long tradition of centralized power, and as the Kremlin regained its strength, Moscow subsumed or eliminated these wealthy individuals. Kiev wields no such political might. Ukraine’s oligarchs were never fully subordinated by the government; their power only grew.
The result is a political system in Ukraine that continues to depend highly on the patronage and support of oligarchs. All major political parties and candidates for powerful posts in parliament and the executive office have their respective oligarch backers. For instance, figures such as Akhmetov, who holds a dominant position in the country’s steel and coal production, and Dmytro Firtash, a major player in the power and chemicals industry, have been leading financiers of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich’s Party of Regions. Other oligarchs, such as Igor Kolomoisky, a banking and industrial magnate, have kept out of direct politics, forging short-term situational alliances with various politicians. Continue.

Ukraine: Truth – the First Casualty

By Eric KRAUS – Once again, we watch as Western governments manipulate their tame media to create a virtual reality that subsequently goes almost totally unchallenged – at least until the failure of the policy becomes too obvious to ignore. Those countries now angrily condemning the “violation of international law” by Russia are the same ones who the week before last actively encouraged the violent overthrow of an elected Ukrainian government. While there is still little evidence of any Russian invasion (it is predominantly the Russian-speaking Crimean forces who have taken power in Crimea), US mercenary companies (Blackwater/Academi, Greystone) have been photographed supporting Right-wing forces in the West of the country, while US and EU diplomats have made little secret of their support for the insurgency.
Having nothing to fear from the US media, John Kerry can angrily fustigate countries for “invading other countries on trumped-up pretexts” without fear of ridicule – conveniently ignoring the fraudulent Iraqi WMD dossier, the invasions of Cambodia and Nicaragua kept secret from the US Congress, or indeed, dozens of other military interventions, covert or overt, on equally flimsy grounds. As Ukraine fractures, Washington is demanding the respect for international boundaries – a consideration politely ignored during the NATO operations in Kosovo; if Catalonia or Scotland can hold referenda to split from their respective countries, then the principle of self-determination has equal legitimacy.
Yes, the reader will argue, raw power remains the basis for international law – but then why not drop the hypocritical discourse and simply assert that they do it because they can do? And, especially, why does the press not challenge its own camp – rather than simply carry water for those in power?
Democracy, in the absence of a properly and objectively informed populace(…)Full analysis.

Crimean Tatars in Ukraine
Deep-seated fears

The Crimean Tatars, numbering some 250,000, are the third largest demographic group in Crimea. They fear that their rights will be sharply curtailed should the referendum on 16 March turn out in Russia’s favour. Fear of Putin and his supporters is equally palpable amongst the millions of Crimean Tatars living in Turkish exile. By Luise Sammann
“Keep calm!” – that’s the order of the day in Crimea, where these days, one wrong word, one wrong move can have grave consequences. “Keep calm!” is also what people are being told in Ankara, 1,000 kilometres away, because what happens in Crimea will sooner or later also affect Turkey, which is home to millions of Crimean Tatars.
Foreign forces may be keen to turn the Crimean crisis into a crisis between the Tatars and Russia, or ultimately a crisis between Turkey and Russia, warned Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu on his visit to Kiev a few days ago. “We will not allow that to happen!” he emphasised, adding: “Territorial integrity, peace and stability in Ukraine are extremely important to Turkey. Crimea in particular is a key concern for us as the gateway to Ukraine, but also because of the Crimean Tatars who live there and the region’s Turkish heritage.”
Celal Icten is grateful for the words of his foreign minister, as diplomatic and indefinite as they may be. “Turkey can and must play an active role in this conflict,” says the chairman of the Istanbul Association of Crimean Tatars. After all, his ethnic group are a Turkish people and are considered a little brother to the Turks. And now they are in danger!
Continue.

Krimtataren in der Ukraine:Tief sitzende Angst

the future: Ukraine

What do the events in Ukraine mean for the rest of the world? Nicu Popescu can see three possible scenarios for the future: Ukraine will go back to the status quo ante, turn into a new Transnistria, or suffer more military interventions from a bolder Russia. François Godement argues that there is one country that is going to be pleased regardless of how conflict unfolds: China. A weakened Russia would make China more influential, but an unchecked Russia reinforces the limits of the Western influence.
Meanwhile, France’s foreign policy has been remarkable during the past 12 months. According to the European Foreign Policy Scorecard, it was a “leader” on more areas than any of the other European member states. However, Jean-Marie Guéhenno argues that France was a “leader” without many followers, and that it might need to adjust its policies to move from activism to real European leadership. Read the Scorecard on our website or download it as a PDF or ebook (kindle / epub). For a discussion of the main findings of the 2014 Scorecard, including the two main successes in Iran and the Balkans, listen to Mark Leonard on our latest podcast.

Dimitar Bechev writes about how Turkey cannot avoid being implicated in the Crimean conflict, and will have to walk a tightrope between its NATO membership and relations with Russia.

Another discussion on European foreign policy featured George Soros, who discussed his latest book The Tragedy of the European Union with journalists at ECFR’s London office on Wednesday. Topics ranged from Abenomics and central bank measures to Scottish independence and Angela Merkel’s influence. In a discussion with British politicians later that day, he blamed the austerity approach pushed by Germany for the failure to resolve the eurozone crisis and the rise of extreme euro-sceptic parties.

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