Persistent terrorist threat in Turkey and the Levant.


Ankara’s Relations with Washington Hitting a Rough Patch?
turkey_usa_israel_relations_by_ay_deezy-d49o6z2

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Sudan’s Spreading Conflict

Nairobi/Brussels, 14 February 2013: Only a comprehensive solution can end Sudan’s vicious civil wars that are exacting a horrendous toll on the country and its peoples.

Sudan’s Spreading Conflict (I): War in South Kordofan, the latest report from the International Crisis Group, is the first in a series that will analyse the roots of the conflicts that continue in Sudan’s peripheries despite the secession in 2011 of South Sudan. The South Kordofan fighting resumed that same year and shows no sign of ending anytime soon. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) is much better armed than it was during the first war, and the state’s ethnic cleavages that the Khartoum government used to exploit to terrible effect are much less pronounced.

“The conflict has all the makings of strategic stalemate, with each side hoping pressure from elsewhere will change its foe’s calculations”, says Cedric Barnes, Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa Project Director. “Unless the government and the allied rebel groups negotiate a comprehensive solution to Sudan’s multiple conflicts, there will be no stop to the endless wars plaguing the country”.

Although the root causes of the conflict – political marginalisation, land dispossession and unimplemented promises – remain the same, the SPLM-N is much stronger, with as many as 30,000 soldiers, better weapons and a large stockpile of arms. Moreover, it is now part of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), an insurgent alliance that also includes Darfur’s rebel groups.

All indications suggest the conflict has settled into a vicious impasse, in which Khartoum is unable to dislodge the rebels ensconced in the Nuba Mountains, and the SPLM-N and its allies are incapable of holding much territory in South Kordofan’s lowlands.

The war restarted because key provisions of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in particular the promised popular consultations to address long-held grievances, were not implemented. A last-ditch attempt to stop the spiralling conflict, the 28 June 2011 Framework Agreement that included political and security arrangements, was unacceptable to hardliners.

Stalled negotiations between Khartoum and the SPLM-N should resume, but a major impasse is the divide over the scope of the conflict. While the rebels have increasingly asserted a national agenda, the government, as well as local political leaders and some international players, prefer focusing on the local dimensions of the war.

Piecemeal power-sharing arrangements often merely stimulate further rebellion with the aim of winning more concessions from Khartoum. If negotiations do not fully address the political marginalisation of the peripheries, calls for self-determination will increase, including in South Kordofan. A comprehensive solution, including broader governance reform and meaningful national dialogue, is necessary to put an end to the country’s conflicts and build a durable peace.

“Neither side is strong enough to win militarily”, says EJ Hogendoorn, Crisis Group’s Deputy Africa Program Director. “Unless the government and the international community engage with both the armed and unarmed opposition and achieve a comprehensive solution to Sudan’s chronic problems, the conflicts will continue and multiply, threatening the stability of the entire country”.

Executive Summary | Full PDF Report

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First, we discussed how the Jan. 16 attack against the Tigantourine natural gas facility near Ain Amenas, Algeria, would result in increased security at energy facilities in the region. Second, we discussed foreign interventions in Libya and Syria and how they have regional or even global consequences that can persist for years. Finally, last week we discussed how the robust, layered security at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara served to thwart a suicide bombing.
Together, these topics spotlight the heightened and persistent terrorist threat in North Africa as well as Turkey and the Levant. They also demonstrate that militants in those regions will be able to acquire weapons with ease. But perhaps the most important lesson from them is that as diplomatic missions are withdrawn or downsized and as security is increased at embassies and energy facilities, the threat is going to once again shift toward softer targets.
Obviously, individuals desiring to launch a terrorist attack seek to strike the highest-profile, most symbolic target possible. If it is well known, the target can
magnify the terror, especially when the operation grabs the attention of international media. Such extensive exposure not only allows people around the globe to be informed minute by minute about unfolding events, but it also permits them to become secondary, vicarious victims of the unfolding violence. The increased exposure also ensures that the audience affected by the operation becomes far larger than just those in the immediate vicinity of the attack.

Turkey and Lebanon

While the jihadist militants in Syria are currently fixated on attacking the Syrian regime, there is nonetheless a non-jihadist threat in Turkey — and perhaps Lebanon — that emanates from the Syrian intelligence and its proxy groups in the region. However, the Feb. 1 attack against the U.S. Embassy in Ankara demonstrated the limitations of the capabilities of one of those proxies, the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front.

Carrying on the operational legacy of its parent organization, Devrimci Sol, the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front aspires to conduct spectacular attacks, but its attacks frequently fizzle or fail. Successfully striking a hardened target such as the U.S. Embassy is beyond the group’s capability. In fact, the group frequently botches attacks against softer targets, as in the attack against an American fast food chain outlet in May 2012 that failed when the explosive device malfunctioned.

The Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front’s limited tactical capability supports the theory that the attack against the U.S. Embassy in Ankara was commissioned by the Syrian regime. The group has even failed in suicide bombings against Turkish police stations with far less security; it knew it was attacking something beyond its reach. But at the same time, the group’s limited capability and the failure of the attack against the U.S. Embassy will likely result in a shift to softer targets if the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front was acting at Syria’s behest and the Syrians have asked for additional anti-American attacks.

As noted last week, Devrimci Sol conducted dozens of attacks against U.S. and NATO targets in Turkey during late 1990 and early 1991 at the behest of Saddam Hussein. The majority of these attacks were directed against soft targets such as U.S. corporate offices, nongovernmental organizations, hotels and restaurants. We believe these same targets are in jeopardy of attack by the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front now.

Syria maintains a number of proxy militants in Lebanon, including Hezbollah. Hezbollah has its own calculations and may not be as willing as Syria’s smaller proxy groups to act on Syria’s behalf. Hezbollah maintains a far more sophisticated militant capability than these small groups and is able to attack hard targets, unlike the smaller groups. Therefore, if the Syrians commission a terrorist attack in Lebanon and Hezbollah does not help them, the attacks their proxy groups will carry out will be quite limited — and will again focus on soft targets.

By Scott Stewart

Read more:

Soft Targets Back in Focus | Stratfor 

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Turkey builds closer oil links with Kurds, angering US

US officials are concerned that Turkey’s strained ties with Baghdad could have implications for the rest of the region.

The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq said last week it planned to press ahead with building an oil-export pipeline to Turkey. “We want to have an oil pipeline to ourselves,” said Ashti Hawrami, the Iraqi Kurdish minister for natural resources.

Crude from the Kurdistan region used to be shipped to world markets through a Baghdad-controlled pipeline to Turkey, but exports via that channel dried up in December, from a peak of around 200,000 barrels per day (bpd), due to a row with Baghdad over payments.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish prime minister, said his country was not obliged to wait for a new agreement between the central Iraqi government and the KRG over oil exploration and export rights, even though Washington wanted Ankara to be cautious.

“Our economic relations are getting broader, despite everything, including America,” Mr Erdogan said last week, referring to the KRG.

Mr Erdogan, who has been careful to develop close relations with the US, freely acknowledged tensions with Washington over the issue.

“America says: ‘What you are doing is wrong,'” Mr Erdogan said. “We are saying: ‘No, Iraq’s constitution allows it.'”

The present constitution, drawn up after the US-led invasion in 2003, gave Iraqi Kurds the right to more than 18 per cent of the country’s oil reserves, he added.

By Thomas Seibert

Full analysis.

More:

  1. Is Orthodox Denomination Connected to Coup Case?

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Ankara’s Relations with Washington Hitting a Rough Patch?

This has not been a great week for Francis Ricciardone, the American ambassador in Turkey. Last Friday his embassy was attacked by a leftist suicide bomber, resulting in the death of a Turkish guard. The event should have brought Turkey and the United States closer, but only a few days after the attack, Ricciardone found himself being harshly criticized by government officials and summoned to the foreign ministry after he delivered comments questioning the fairness of Turkey’s judicial system and the country’s record on freedom of expression.

But the dustup over the ambassador’s remarks is actually only one of several issues that are now threatening what is supposed to be yet another “golden age” in TurkeyUS relations. While a few years ago the two countries didn’t see eye-to-eye on a host of problems, particularly regarding Iran’s nuclear program and Turkey’s deteriorating relations with Israel, cooperation on dealing with the crisis in Syria, Ankara’s distancing itself from Iran and an American push to forge a strong personal relationship between President Barack Obama and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan have all helped bring Turkey-US ties to a renewed high point.

As Today’s Zaman points out, Ankara and Washington are now having to contend with some simmering disputes that could threaten their “honeymoon.” Regarding Iraq, Washington is unhappy with Ankara’s push to develop independent energy deals with the Kurdistan Regional Government, fearing this could threaten the country’s unity and lead to increased conflict between Baghad and Irbil. Regarding Syria, Ankara continues to be frustrated by Washington’s continuing refusal to take a more aggressive stance regarding the toppling of the Assad regime and the arming of the rebels there. Even the issue of Israel has again come up, with the State Department describing Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s critical reaction to Israel’s recent airstrike in Syria as “troubling” and saying that Washington had conveyed its displeasure through its embassy in Ankara, something which the Turks denied. (For more on Ankara’s response to the Israeli strike in Syria, take a look at Michael Koplow’s excellent blog post over at the Ottomans and Zionists blog.)

Full article.

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The Next Insurgency in Tunisia
by Habib Sayah

While the spotlights in Tunisia are turned toward the struggle between the ruling Islamist party Ennahdha and the rising secular coalition led by former Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi, another player is preparing to take the stage. As tens of thousands of Tunisians gathered at the Jellaz cemetery in Tunis for the funeral of slain secular opposition leader Chokri Belaid, a jihadi organization named Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) has begun placing its pieces on the chessboard.
Read full article

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Tunisia and Lebanon: A Tale of Two Assassinations
by Khaled Chouket

For some in Tunisia, the degree of resemblance between the assassination of Tunisian liberal opposition leader Chokri Belaid on February 6, 2013, and the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri on February 14, 2005, is disconcerting. With the anniversary of Hariri’s death upon us, Tunisian politicians grappling with a solution to the current political crisis should view the comparison with Lebanon as a cautionary tale of what is at stake if they cannot reach a compromise.
Read full article

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Iraq’s Sectarian Tensions Rise as Maliki Clings to Power
by Nazar Janabi

On December 18, government forces arrested the security team of the prominent Sunni Iraqi Finance Minister Rafa al-Essawi, causing a critical escalation of demonstrations in the Sunni majority provinces of Iraq. As a result, and in an attempt to curtail Prime Minister Maliki’s apparent power grab, the Iraqi Parliament passed legislation limiting the roles of president, prime minister, and speaker of the parliament, to two terms. If the Supreme Federal Court does not uphold this law – the anticipated outcome – demonstrations will likely escalate, causing further violence that will lead the country down a dangerous path which could lead to an outbreak of sectarian violence.
Read full article

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The Refugee Factor

Kai Kverme | February 14, 2013 11:27

The Syrian crisis has revealed the far-reaching and fundamental disagreements among Lebanon’s Christian parties. | عربي

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